Decline of Mughal Empire Essay Example for Free

Decline of Mughal Empire Essay Various explanations are put forward for the revolts which brought about the collapse of the Mughal Empire. There has existed for a long time the thesis of â€Å"Hindu Reaction† as the main factor behind the revolts against Aurangzeb. Its proponents tent, however, to rely more on present sentiment than on contemporary evidence. Main concern is with what 17th and early 18th century texts have to say; and they, at any rate, put the greatest store by the economic and administrative causes of the upheaval and hardly ever refer to religious reaction or consciousness of nationality. The assignment system, as it was established and worked under the great Mughals, necessarily presupposed the prevalence of a certain type of economic order. The jagirs were divorced, as far as possible, from any permanent rights to the land, and were essentially assignments of revenue, assessed in terms of money. This suited best an economy where the cash nexus was well established; but that in turn meant that agrarian trade should have been both brisk and extensive. Both these conditions were present in Mughal India. At the same time, commercial activity could prosper best under an imperial system with its uniform methods of tax collection and administration and its control of the routes. In so far, therefore, as the assignment system strengthened imperial power it also reinforced the economic foundation of its own existence. Unlike the feudal lord of Western Europe, the Mughal jagirdar might not have needed to harbour any fear of money and trade undermining his power. The unity and cohesion of the Mughal ruling class found its practical expression in the absolute power of the emperor. The jagidari as an individual member of the government class had theoretically no right or privileges apart from those received from the emperor: he could not manage his jagir just as he pleased, and was required to conform to imperial regulation. The rate of the land revenue demand and the methods by which it was to be assessed and collected were all prescribed by the imperial administration. The emperor also decreed what other taxes were to be collected. The conduct of the jagirdar and his agents was supposed to be watched over and checked by officials such as qanungos and chaudhuris, and faujdars and news-writers. Imperial revenue policy was obviously shaped by 2 basic considerations. First, since military contingents were maintained by the mansabdars out of the revenues of their jagirs, the tendency was to set the revenue demand so high as to secure the greatest military strength for the empire. But, secondly, it was clear that if the revenue rate was raised so high as to leave the peasant not enough for his survival, the revenue collections could soon fall in absolute terms. The revenue demand as set by the imperial authorities was thus designed ideally to approximate to the surplus produce, leaving the peasant just the barest minimum needed for subsistence. It was this appropriation of the surplus produce that created the great wealth of the Mughal ruling class. The contrast was accordingly striking between â€Å"the rich in their great superfluity and the utter subjection and poverty of the common people†. There seems, moreover to have been a tendency, increasing in its effect with time, to press still harder upon the peasant. This tendency seemed to derive from the very nature of the jagir system. The imperial administration, which could observe the long-term interest of the empire and the ruling class, did, probably, strive to set a limit to the revenue demand. A great increase in revenue demand was approved in the course of 17th century is based on an oversimplified view of the evidence; and there are indications that the increase in cash rates did not outstrip the increase in the prices of the interest agricultural produce. But there was an element of contra ion between the interests of the imperial administration and the individual jagirdar. A jagirdar, whose assignment was liable to be transferred any moment and who never held the same jagir for more than 3 or 4 years at the most, could have no interest in following a far-sighted policy of agricultural development. His personal interests would sanction any act of oppression that conferred an immediate benefit upon him, even if it ruined the peasantry and so destroyed the revenue-paying capacity of that area for long time. Owing to the constant and unpredictable transfers of jagirs, Bhimsen tells us late in Aurangzeb’s reign, the agents of the jagirdars had given up the practice of helping the peasantry or making firm arrangements. Moreover, the ‘amils of the jagirdars were not sure of their own tenures of employment and so,† proceeding tyrannically†, were unrelenting in the collection of revenue. When the jagirdar, instead of appointing his agents to collect the revenue, farmed out the jagir, the evil was worse still. The land was being laid waste, says Sadiq khan, writing of Shahjahan’s reign, through bribery and revenue farming, as a result of which the peasantry was being robbed and plundered. These statements show that in 17th century the belief had become deep-rooted that the system of jagir transfers led inexorably to a reckless exploitation of the peasantry. It was a result which the imperial administration might check for some time but could not ultimately prevent. It was inevitable that the actual burden on the peasantry should become so heavy in some areas as to encroach upon their means of survival. Manuchy, who on this occasion assumes the viewpoint of the ruling class, declares that they have no money. The chastisements and instruments [of torture] are very severe. They are also made to endure hunger and thirst†¦. They feigns death (as sometimes really happens)†¦. but this trick secures them no compassion†¦. Frequently, therefore, the peasants were compelled to sell their women, children and cattle in order to meet the revenue demand. But the enslavement was not generally so voluntary. They are carried off, attached to heavy iron chains, to various market and fair, with their poor, unhappy wives behind them carrying their small children in their arms, all crying and lamenting their evil situation. Failure to pay the revenue was not the only cause for which such punishment was inflicted upon the peasants. It was the general law in Mughal Empire that if any robbery occurred within the assignment or jurisdiction, respective, of a jagirdar or a faujdar, he was obliged to either trace the culprits and recover the loot, or make the payment himself. In Gujarat, a Dutch traveler noted in 1629 that â€Å"the peasants are more oppressed than formerly and frequently abscond†, so that the revenues had fallen. What the condition were during the early years of Aurangzeb’s reign may be judged from Bernier’s long discourse on the ills of the Mughal Empire. He too declares that â€Å"a considerable portion of the good land remains untilled from the want of peasants†, many of whom â€Å"perish in consequence of the bad treatment they receive from the Governors†, or are left no choice but to â€Å"abandon the country†. Bernier sights example of peasants leaving â€Å"the country† to â€Å"seek a more tolerable mode of existence either in towns or in the camps; as bearers of burdens, carriers of water, or servants to horsemen†. The urban population was large, relatively speaking, and the countryside must have been the source of the innumerable â€Å"peons†, and unskilled labourers who filled the towns. The lot of the aimless migrant was not a happy one. A point could accordingly arrive where there was no choice left to the peasant but that between starvation or slavery and armed resistance. It may be unnecessary to say that by willingness the mass of the people were anything but warlike. It is recorded as a peculiarity of Malwa that both the peasants and artisans of the province used to carry arms. Pelsaert (c. 1626) observed that despite so much misery and want:†the people endure patiently, professing that they do not deserve anything better†. Nevertheless, there was a limit to endurance. The classic act of defiance on the part of the peasants was the refusal to pay land revenue. But a particular act of oppression committed against them might also goad them into rebellion. They are also frequently alleged to have taken to robbery; Villages and areas, which thus went into rebellion or refused to pay taxes, were known as mawas and zor-talab, as opposed to the revenue-paying village, called raiyati. Usually, the villages, which were protected in some measures by ravines or forests or hills, were more likely to defy the authorities than those in the open plains. Very often acts of defiance by the peasants were mere isolated incidents. The intensity of distress probably varied from village to village, according to the burden of the revenue demand imposed upon each. But distress to be translated into armed resistance required the presence of some other factors as well. Since weaponry was crucial to even the initial success of any act of defiance, the readiness of the upper strata of peasants, possessed of muskets or swords, might often determine whether such an act would take place at all. However, there were still two social forces remained working among the peasantry, which could help to ignite, and extent the scale of such peasant uprisings. The real transformation of peasant unrest was probably brought about by the intervention of elements from the zamindar class that had their own motives in opposing the Mughal ruling class. This came through two distinct processes: either the peasant rebellions, at some stages of their development, passed under the leadership of zamindars or, from the very beginning, the desperation of the peasants provided recruits for rebelling zamindars. The rising of the oppressed thus became inseparable from the conflict between two oppressing classes. Official texts frequently reflect an attitude of hostility towards the zamindars as a class. Abu –l Fazl declares that â€Å"the custom of most of the zamindars of Hindustan is that leaving the path of single-mindedness they look to every side and whoever appears more powerful and tumult-raising, they join him†. In southwestern Bengal in 1695-98 the mughal authority was seriously shaken by the rebellion of Sobhs Singh, â€Å"the zamindar of Chitwa and Barda†, who was joined by Rahim khan, â€Å"the chief of the tribe of the perdition-marked Afghans† of the area: the loyal zamindar of Burdwan was killed, and the area on both sides of the Hugli River ravaged. The struggle between the imperial administration and the zamindars, breaking out frequently into armed conflict, was thus an important feature of the political situation. Under A’zam khan, governor of Gujarat (1632-42), the peasants suffered great oppression, â€Å"most of them fled and took refuge with the zamindars in distant places†. A’zam khan thereupon led an expel the peasants who had fled to his territory, so that they might return to their old homes. In Malwa, in 1644, a similar campaign was organized against the â€Å"zamindar† of Ginnur, not only because â€Å"the peasants of some of the mahals of the jagir of the governor, who had fled to the territory of Ginnur , evaded paying the revenue as well, being backed in this by those infidels†. The peasants and thus frequently became associated in the struggle against Mughal authorities. The new feature that comes to the fore in the reign of Aurangzeb is, indeed, that the zamindars struggle against the Mughal is no longer merely defensive. As the number of starving, homeless peasants grew and the peasants took to arms themselves, it became possible for the zamindars to organize them into large bands, and even armies, and employ them in predatory warfare with the object of extending their own zamindars or areas of dominance. In 1623 it was reported to the court that of â€Å"ganwars and cultivators† on the eastern side of the Yamuna, near Mathura, â€Å"do not cease to commit highway robbery and, protected by dense jungle and fastnesses, live in rebellion, have no fear of anyone and do not pay the revenue to the jagirdars†. In 1645 the â€Å"rebels† near Mathura were apparently still out of control. Such had been the past history of the area which was to be the cradle of the Jat revolt in the time of Aurangzeb. In the accounts of the earlier revolts, the revolting peasants are not identified as Jats. The usual term for them is ganwar, or villager, and in one or two cases, at least, they were probably led by Rajput zamindars. Nevertheless Manchy, who treats of their revolts in some detail, knows the Jat rebels of Aurangzeb’s reign also as simply â€Å"peasants† and assumes them to be the partisans of the same cause as of those whom Akbar had oppressed. The Jat rebellion, properly speaking, dates from the time when Gokula Jat, the zamindar of Talpat near Mathura, â€Å"assembled a large army of Jats and other villagers and raised a rebellion†. He was killed in 1670; but the leadership passed to Raja Ram Jat (d. 1688) and then to Churaman Jat, who is said to have been the son of a zamindar of 11 villages. Over wide areas the peasants refused to pay revenue and took to arms. In1681 Multafat Khan, the faujdar of the district around Agra, was killed when leading an attack on village whose peasants had refused to pay the revenue. The leadership of the Jat rebellion lay in the hands of zamindars is established not only from the known antecedents of its chief men, but also from their conduct. Churaman, for example, is said to have â€Å"seized a number of Churamars [tanners], who are called the menials of Hindus and entrusted [the upkeep of] the ditch [at Bharatpur] to them†. The Jat revolt grew in time into a large plundering movement. This was, perhaps, inevitable under the narrow caste horizons of the peasants and the plundering instincts of their zamindar leaders. The areas devastated expanded from the one pargana of around Agra, sacked by Raja Ram, to its highest extent under Churaman, when â€Å"all the parganas under Agra and Delhi had been sacked and plundered and, from the tumult of that perdition-seeker, the routes and ways were blocked†. The Jat rebels had no connection with any particular religious movement. In the Satnami and Sikh rebellions, on the other hand, religion almost entirely replaced caste as the cementing bond among rebel ranks. The Satnamis were a sect of the Bairgis. The traditional date of the foundation of this sect by a native of Narnaul is 1657. The Satnami beliefs, as stated in the sect’s scripture, centred round an unalloyed monothesim. Ritual and superstition were alike condemned, and allegiance was explicitly rendered to Kabir. There was also a definite social aspect of the message. Caste distinctions within the community of believers were forbidden; so also one’s living on the charity of others. An attitude of sympathy with the poor and hostility towards uthority and wealth is apparent from such commandments as the following: â€Å"do not harass the poor†¦shun the company of an unjust king and a wealthy and dishonest man; do not accept a gift from these or from kings†. Such a religion could best appeal to the lower classes. In a possible to them made during the early years of Aurangzeb, a revenue official declared that though certain â€Å"cultivators† in a village in the pargana of Bhatnair were â€Å"l iving with their women, children, possessions and cattle in the garb of Bairagis†, they were â€Å"not free from the thoughts of sedition and robbery†. The revolt in fact began (1672) as a rural affray. Just as it has been said of Islam that it is a â€Å"religion for towns-people†, so it will, perhaps, not wrong to say that Sikhism is a peasant religion. The verses of Guru Nanak â€Å"are all in the language of the Jatts of the Punjab. And Jatt in the dialect of the Punjab means a villager, a rustic†. Guru Arjan (d. 1606) took the first step in creating a well-knit and disciplined organization. The Sikh became a military power under Guru Hargobind (1606-45), who created an army of his own, and, as a result, came into armed collision with Mughal power. He thus founded a tradition, which was doggedly continued by the last Guru, Gobind Singh (1676-1708), till; finally, in 1709-10 Banda was able to put into the field in sarkar Sirhind â€Å"an army of innumerable men, like ants and locusts, belonging to the low castes of Hindus and ready to die† at his orders. The Marathas undoubtedly constituted the greatest single force responsible for the downfall of the Mughal Empire. On the history of their uprising, and the factors that contributed to its genesis and success, so much has been written that it would seem presumptuous to add to the mass. One can, however, legitimately draw attention to the agrarian contexts in which this momentous event took place. Some peasants are not remiss in paying the authorized revenue, but are made desperate by the evil of this excruciating spoliation it came to be represented at the imperial court that the Marathas obtain collaboration from the peasants of the imperial dominions. It was, thereupon, ordered that the horses and weapons found in every village should be confiscated. When this happened in most villages, the peasants, providing themselves with horses and arms, joined the Marathas. Shivaji had used the peasants in a different sphere altogether. They were the â€Å"Naked Starved Rascals† who formed much of his army. Armed with â€Å"only lances and long sword two inches wide†, they were â€Å"good at Surprising and Ransacking†, but not â€Å"for a pitched Field†. They had to live by plunder only, for Shivaji’s reputed maxim was: â€Å"No Plunder, no pay†. This was the form of salvation which Shivaji and his successors held out to the destitute peasantry of the Dakhin. As Bhimsen’s account shows, the military operations of the Marathas did not offer any relief to the cultivating peasants. On the contrary, they suffered grievously from the ravages of both the Maratha armies and their opponents. In 1671 the castellan of Udgir reported that reported that owing to the operations of â€Å"the imperial forces and the villainous enemy† all the peasants had fled the pargana and for two years no revenue had been collected, the Mughal too would burn villages, devastate the crop and enslave men and women. As the range of the conflict grew, and the number of victims increased, a still larger number of the â€Å"naked starved rascals†, themselves plundered, had no alternative left but to join the Marathas and become plunderers themselves. And so the unending circle went on. â€Å"There is no province or district,† confesses Aurangzeb in his last years, where the infidels have not raised a tumult and since they are not chastised, they have established themselves everywhere. Most of the country has been rendered desolate and if any place is inhabited, the peasants there have probably come to terms with the ‘Robbers’ [Ashqiya, official Mughal name for the Marathas]†¦ If the peasant distress was at the root of these rebellions that shook the Mughal Empire to its foundations, the rebellions themselves represent a historical paradox in that the alleviation of such distress nowhere forms part of rebels’ proclaimed objectives or of their actual deeds and measures.